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ABSTRACT

Conceptual architectures provide a means for architecting complex network
centric systems. This approach provides the basis for security architecture for a network
enabled capability. Security assessments and security architectures are of utmost
importance in any system development to ensure that systems are properly protected from
both unauthorized access and or malicious applications, especially for network enabled
systems as societies’ use of such system approaches an all time high. Therefore a need for
a structured approach in designing such systems is necessary and has been recognized. Of
particular importance is a methodology that cuts across a wide variety of security tasks
and needs. By assessing the challenges, relevance and requirements a security
architecture methodology is put forward to take care of the security needs of a complex
network centric system. This thesis describes an over-arching security architecture
methodology for large network enabled systems that can be scaled down for smaller
network centric operations such as present at the University of Missouri-Rolla. By
leveraging the five elements of security policy & standards, security risk management,
security auditing, security federation and security management, of the proposed security
architecture and addressing the specific needs of UMR, the methodology was used to
determine places of improvement for UMR. Conclusions and future works were also
highlighted.
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1. INTRODUCTION

In describing a security architecture methodology, several relevant concepts
emerge. These concepts include trust, policy and standards, services, risk management
and so on. Also, these concepts in themselves have enormous application and span a
broad spectrum, across various disciplines.
However, in this thesis, these concepts are defined or represented in the context of
security in information technology networks, which is the bed rock of net-centricity.
Furthermore, net-centricity or network-enabled capability (NEC) which society
have come to depend on is built on strong architecture; unfortunately it is designed with
the intention of being open. This places the responsibility of securing the networks and
information to the individual users or organizations, ergo the need to develop a security
architecture framework or methodology that can easily be adapted and scaled for various
systems.
The recent progress achieved in information technology has increased the
connectivity within societies, governments, industries and individuals. This has largely
been made possible through internet and broadband communication technology
advances; which in turn have created systems that are very different from past systems.
Network-centric is the term used to describe such systems. These systems comprise a
diverse category of large and complex systems whose purpose is providing network-type
services. Network-centric systems are also frequently collaborative systems that are built
on partially voluntary and uncontrolled interaction of complex elements in an ad hoc
environment [1].
A security architecture methodology is needed as systems become more complex
and multi-disciplinary. Network-centric systems are complex not just because of the
number of subsystems and components present, but also because of real time data
components required and the diversity involved. Some examples of network centric
systems are the military systems, banking system and the educational systems. All these
systems and their respective industries have come to rely heavily on information
technology and the net-centricity it affords. This further emphasizes the critical need for
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security architecture for these systems and invariably a security architecture
methodology.
Therefore, there are challenges in prescribing an architectural methodology for
the security of such a system, which will accommodate the subsystems complexity and
real-time data distribution capabilities as well as the diversity associated with them. In
order to avoid system degradation resulting from failure to handle large amounts of realtime data distribution, complexities in net-centric systems need to be addressed.

1.1. MOTIVATION
Going through several papers searching for information in security architecture, it
became apparent that there was no paper addressing security architecture methodology,
especially a step by step application for a network-enabled capability. Therefore, this
thesis aims to put forward a methodology that can be applied for both large and small netcentric systems.
A security architecture methodology should include physical protection, network
security, message-level security and application-level security. In addition, should
include security in the form of authorization, privacy, policy, trust, and secure
conversation. Lastly the methodology should accommodate a federation of systems.
1.1.1. Goals of Security Architecture Methodology. At the beginning of this
thesis, the following goals for a security architecture development methodology were
established in order to set a clear focus for the paper.
(1) The methodology should efficiently and effectively facilitate the development
of an integrated security architectures and plans for enterprise networks.
(2) The methodology should facilitate an integrated solution across very complex
heterogeneous information systems.
(3) The methodology must result in a final product that covers all customers’
requirements, policies and guidelines.
(4) The methodology must provide the customer with visibility into the process as
well as the solutions.
(5) The methodology needs to facilitate incorporation of changes due to advances
in technology and revisions of policies and guidelines.
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1.1.2. Relevance of Security Architecture to NEC.

In order to have a

perspective of what the task process will entail, an attempt is made to discuss some of the
reasons security architecture is necessary for a network-enabled capability (NEC) under
the following high- level groupings.
Information Sharing
Information sharing is fundamental for success in both every day lives and
business ventures; however it is important that the information that is sent be secured,
that is, the information be retrieved and viewed by only the intended parties.
Security architecture therefore supports information sharing by assuring users that
their communications will be private. Security architecture establishes a common
language for security. It provides structure which can facilitate learning and
understanding of the complexities of the security requirements and solutions and their
interactions with the rest of the system. It provides the industry a coherent way of how
elements of the security solution must fit into the overall.
Interoperability
Net-centricity systems suppose a federation, a no single owner situation and
interoperability of all these systems is required to make it work. Security architecture
provides a coherent technical approach to security across any organization that would
enable secure interoperability. It would enable the representation at any time the best
knowledge on technical security solutions.
It would help present security problems and solution as an easily assessable and
identifiable process which could be described at different levels of detail i.e. from high
level to lower levels of implementation.
It would show some progress in prototyping scenario which can be validated by
implementing any part of a security architecture using the methodology provided
Uninterrupted Operations
Services and businesses that have come to depend on net-centricity work most
exceptionally because of their uninterrupted operations. This has come to mean that the
infrastructures that run on a net-centric environment are critical and needs a security
measure to protect it. Security architecture therefore provides a guideline for the
protection of all these critical infrastructures.
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Security Risk Management
Security architecture would provide a coordinated security risk management that
would provide guidelines for decision making and, as a result, would optimize the
investment in security resources.
A security risk management process would provide a tool which will help in the
implementation of the chosen risk analysis methodology. The input will be continuously
changing threat, vulnerability and impact (or asset value) information and the output will
show the requirements for security countermeasures of all types (e.g. physical, personnel,
procedural and technical) to maintain risk at acceptable levels.
It would provide for an informed risk management decisions to be made by
allowing accreditors to identify all the security implications caused by a change to any
element of the infrastructure.
It would help in identifying security risks for a NEC for which countermeasures
might need optimizing or are yet to exist.
From the above potential beneficiaries can be derived such as stakeholders,
security risk owners, capability managers, accreditors, system managers, security
(including cyberdefence) managers, researchers and developers, system designers,
security product designers, product vendors and even end-users who will use and benefit
from the security architecture.

1.2. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Some challenges that would be encountered in the design of security architecture
and its methodology for a large net-centric system are put forward in this section.
1.2.1. Challenges of Prescribing Security Architecture for NEC.

In

prescribing security architecture for a NEC, challenges are faced. Some of the challenges
are unique to information technology/NEC while the others are general. Some possible
requirement for security architecture have been listed above, possible challenges that
might be encountered are mentioned subsequently.
Firewall Limitations: – It is of import to know the limitations of firewall which
may not detect potential attacks. Examples are attacks that are disguised to cause internal
application buffer overflow. New firewall products designed to protect Web Services at
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the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) level are in the market now, however it has
yet to be determined how effective they are and also their position within the security
architecture is not yet clear.
Service-Level Security Semantics: – Definitions and standardizations are yet to
permeate the fabric of security. The standards for the mechanism by which different
parties interface with each other to achieve security goals such as authentication and
authorization are yet to be defined and prescribed.
Interoperability of Security Solutions: –The lack of standard at the service
interface level, has made it impossible for security products currently in the market
currently to be fully interoperable.
Security vs. Performance: – The use of public key (PK) encryption in security
architecture requires computation intensive tasks that include message signing,
encryption, and certificate validation. In this instance sending a secure message will be
several times much slower than a less secure version, and a direct inverse relationship
between performance and security can be computed. Therefore cautious planning and
effective optimization techniques are necessary to meet operational requirements.
Impacts on Existing Policies and Processes: – In addition to the identification of
system boundaries, trust relationships need to be established for a more dynamic
application in a net-centric environment. This will require the establishment of trust
domain relationships.
1.2.2. Other Challenges. In addition to the above, the challenges below need to
be considered, especially keeping in mind that security needs to be dynamic since it has
become increasingly clear that the term “security” means nothing unless[2] it is possible
to know who needs to keep out and for how long they need to be kept out.
The idea of a security architecture methodology for net-centric system not only
implies the governance and maintenance of the architecture but that dynamic security
policies and policy based access control be incorporated into the architecture and
methodology e upgrades. This will furthermore entail more challenge in achieving an
architecture which is sufficiently adaptable in its implementation of the risk management
methodology and accommodate future uncertainties. If the security risk management
processes are modeled incorrectly in the higher levels of the architecture, the problems
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will be cascaded to lower levels. In this thesis an attack tree model is used to demonstrate
the importance of risk management.
It is also important to note that a user-friendly architecture will be of concern
since the architecture will be used by a wide variety of people most of whom may not be
versed in all the technical details.
A security architecture for net-centric system will need to be achieved using a
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) with “ubiquitous security services” being applied at
all OSI layers [3]. Melrose and Madahar [4] uses an OSI/ISO layer type architecture to
describe an overarching security architecture for NATO NEC which can be incorporated
in this methodology description.

1.3. SECTION ORGANIZATION
In here describes the structure for the rest of this thesis. Section 2 is the literature
review. It presents a brief summary of security architectures of the Department of
Defense Information System and the NATO, the standards and heuristics tool that help in
systems architecting, and document of the Joint Technical Architecture- a DoD document
that specifies technical standards for interoperability. It also discusses research in
complexity theory, architecture overview- by presenting the different types of
architecture, security architecture and security architecture, architecture frameworks and
network enabled capability.
Section 3 discusses the methodology of a security architecture -by looking at the
requirements, critical success factors for a security architecture methodology, and delves
in details on the actual methodology.
Section 4 presents an example of security architecture for net-centric system using
the University of Missouri-Rolla by adopting the methodology already prescribed in
section. Finally, Section 5 presents conclusions and future work.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW

In recent times, all systems are distributed to some degree. They include[5]
communication system allocating channels through distributed switches, aircraft flown
using distributed controls, computer memories built out of hundreds of thousands of
distributed active elements, banking systems and credit card services operating at
different locations serving customer several million miles away, military operations
relying on distributed elements, all operating in whole or part through network enabled
capability. Unfortunately, as societies have come to rely heavily on information
technology and the advances it affords by way of net-centricity, it becomes increasingly
important that net centric systems such as these systems mentioned should have security
architecture in place to help in the countering of unauthorized access to systems.
Hence, the criticality and the urgency of security architecture, ergo a methodology
for such distributed/net-centric system cannot be over emphasized. It goes without saying
that because of societies reliance on these system, an outage due to an attack will be
costly, both in monetary terms and otherwise.
Even though societies have achieved stupendous technological advances,
infrastructures are still prone to security flaws ever more so now, than in previous
technologies. The difference between previous security measures and current security
architecture for NEC is that, it has become much easier to crack security because of
technology. For instance a safe that recognizes and stores the index finger to unlock it is
much easier to crack because if the finger impression is not wiped, using any other mould
to make the impression will unlock the safe.
Applications for this thesis extends from civilian operations such as in the energy
sector (pipeline monitoring of petroleum products), telecommunications sector (secure
communication for customers), to military operations.
There was little information in literatures regarding security architecture
methodology for large scale net-centric systems; however various literatures on security,
security architecture, net-centric system, complexity and more were reviewed; from
which information has been gathered on what security architecture should consist of. A
step by step method of prescribing this security architecture is therefore needed to
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provide both architecture designers and implementors alike a guide of how and what is
necessary to build security architecture successfully in systems that are network enabled.
It is important to note that network enabled capability and network centric/netcentric are used interchangeably in this thesis to refer to activities across and within a
network of participants in a continuously-evolving, complex community of people,
devices, information and services interconnected by a communications network to
achieve optimal benefit of resources and better synchronization of events and their
consequences. This entails allowing a wide range of people including entities that are
known and are trusted as well as strangers, access to networks which might be misused in
a manner that threatens the network. Furthermore, the challenges mentioned previously
are compounded by the fact that complexities existing in net-centric systems need to be
address due to real time data demand and distribution especially in military operations,
therefore the discussion and understanding of complexity theory.
Complexity can be described as the degree of difficulty to understand, verify and
formulate system behavior; even when knowing information about the components, their
numbers, arrangements, functional properties and interactions. Edmonds [6] writes that
complexity is that property of a language expression which makes it difficult to formulate
its overall behavior even when given almost complete information about its atomic
components and their inter-relations. Complexity can also be defined as a measure of
uncertainty in achieving a set of specific functions or functional requirements [7]. This
leads to the concept of securing a complex network of people using the information
technology infrastructure.

2.1. ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW
The DoD Goal Security Architecture (DGSA) [8] [9] defines four types of
architecture. DGSA was developed as part of the technical Architecture Framework for
Information Management (TAFIM). The four types of architectures are discussed
overleaf.
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Abstract Architecture
The abstract architecture defines principles and fundamental concepts that guide
the selection and organization of functions. This level of architecture cites principles,
fundamental concepts and functions that satisfy the typical security requirements.
Generic Architecture
The generic architecture defines the general types of components and allowable
standards to be used and identifies any necessary guidelines for their application.
Logical Architecture
This is a design that meets a hypothetical set of requirements. It serves as a
detailed example that illustrates the results of applying a generic architecture to specific
circumstances.
Specific Architecture
The

specific

architecture

addresses

components,

interfaces,

standards,

performance and cost. Specific architectures show how all the selected information
security components and mechanisms combine to meet the security requirements of the
systems under consideration.
Other architecture typologies exist, such as Figure 2.1 depicted over leaf.
Conceptually this is the kind of typology used in this thesis.
The term “architecture” is used extensively in several fields of study and in
diverse context, but generally refers to a conceptual, abstract or real, design or plan that
describes the system, including the constituent parts and the relationships between them,
its structure, organization, policies and standards. [4]
Architecture is the art of designing the human built environment. It is an
interdisciplinary field, which draws on mathematics, science, art, technology, social
sciences, politics, history, and philosophy [10]. “Architecture is a science, arising out of
many other sciences, and adorned with much and varied learning: by the help of which a
judgment is formed of those works which are the result of other arts.” (Marcus V. Pollio,
died ca. 25 BC).
The diverse context of the term architecture ranges from the familiar use in the
building sector to use in biology (e.g. to describe the architecture of the human anatomy
composed of organs, the nervous systems and the circulatory systems), to use in
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enterprise (e.g. architecture regarding the business structures, constituent processes and
workflows) [8]. Architectures, which can be represented by diverse variety of
abstractions, provide a guide to how a system may be realized.

Architecture

Functional
Architecture

Context
Architecture

Structural
Architecture

Systems
Architecture

Security
Architecture
Figure 2.1: Typologies of Architecture

2.1.1. Systems Architecture.

A system is any group of interdependent or

temporally interacting parts or subsystems that come together to provide a service.
Usually the parts or subsystems are systems themselves that provide service on their own
and are generally composed of other parts. This generally implies that a system can be
many things or comprise of many parts. This leads us to systems thinking which is a
technique that may be used to study any kind of system be it human, natural, scientific or
conceptual. The systems approach is based on the tenet that “the whole is more than the
sum of the parts” — Aristotle (384 BC – 322 BC).
Fundamentally systems are a collection of different things which together produce
results unattainable by the elements alone. Even though it may appear that a system can
magically work together (since the subsystems already perform independently), it is
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important to note that they have to be designed or architected in order to maximize their
efficiency. Therefore, systems architecting focuses on the systems as a whole,
particularly when making value judgments of what is required and design decisions of
what are feasible [12].
Systems architecting is the art and science of developing systems solutions by
using systems engineering specialties to develop satisfactory and feasible systems
concepts and certification for client use in ill-structured problem environments [12].
Systems architecting approach goes beyond mathematical analysis and
optimization of systems. Systems architecting quickly and naturally abstracts and
generalizes lessons learned elsewhere, not only for itself but for transfer and
specialization in other branches.
Systems architecting employs various tools among which are standards and
heuristics. Heuristics are lessons learned, derived from experiences collated in several
disciplines and over the years. Heuristics approach to security architecting is necessary
because security is not static, but rather needs to evolve to keep up with changes.
Systems architecting is also characterized by these four attributes of performancetechnical, aesthetic, sociopolitical, risk-uncertainty, complexity, management, costpeople, money, time and schedule-sequencing, events, coordination. All these require
delicate balancing in order to achieve an optimal architecture.
2.1.2. Systems Architecting: the Context for Security Architecture. For this
thesis, it is important to bring together all the elements of security to provide a systems
approach methodology to security architecture. As system complexity increases, systems
architects are faced with the increasingly difficult task of assuring that the evolving form
of the system meets client needs. For security architecture, the systems tools of heuristics
and standards can be applied, while also applying the mathematical analysis needed to
achieve an optimal architecture.
Currently, security architecture requirements are largely specific to individual
organizations; as a result a spread of definitions and understandings exists. In most,
however, security architecture should provide a complete and consistent picture of
security to allow for a step by step approach to managing security risks.
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A security architecture should not only consider the structure of the technical
components but many other facet such as complexity especially when it involves netcentric components , but it should also encompass the organizational and operational
features such as the principles, policies, processes and their

integration and

interrelationships within the overall system it functions and contributes. This allows for
an overarching business enterprise architecture, whether civil or military where
consistency and compliancy is a requirement for success. Therefore Security Architecture
[13] is an integral and critical component within the overall Enterprise Architecture
designed specifically to:
•

Enable secure communications and the appropriate protection of information
resources within corporate infrastructures.

•

Support legal information security requirements established by existing legislation
pertaining to information confidentiality, accessibility, availability and integrity.

•

Support secure, efficient transaction of business and delivery of services. As well
as leverage opportunities to obtain IT Security synergies with the business.
2.1.3. Security Architecture for Net-centric Services Requirements. Security

architecture services should address user identification, authentication, authorization &
access control, administration and audit. The Defense Information Systems Agency
(DISA)

document [14] prescribes a security architecture for net-centric systems. The

primary goal of the security architecture defined in this document is to ensure Enterprise
Services (ES) can be invoked securely. As with every mission critical distributed system
there is a set of key security requirements that must be met:
1. Authentication – Most (if not all) service providers will require that consumers
are authenticated before accepting a service request. Service consumers will also need to
authenticate service providers when a response is received. Different authentication
mechanisms should be supported, and these mechanisms should be configurable and
interchangeable according to service-specific requirements.
2. Authorization – In addition to authentication of a service consumer, access to a
service will also require the consumer to possess certain privileges. These privileges feed
an authorization check that is usually based on access control policies – who can access a
service and under what conditions, for example. Different models may be used for
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authorization, such as mandatory or role based access control. The authorization
implementation should also be extensible to allow for domain- or communities of interest
(COI)-specific customizations.
3. Confidentiality – Protect the underlying communication transport as well as
messages or documents that are carried over the transport so that they cannot be made
available to unauthorized parties. Sometimes only a fragment of the message or
document (e.g. wrapped within a certain XML tag) may need to be kept confidential.
4. Data Integrity – Provide protection against unauthorized alteration of messages
during transit.
5. Non-repudiation – Provide protection against false denial of involvement in a
communication. Non-repudiation ensures that a sender cannot deny a message already
sent, and a receiver cannot deny a message already received. This is especially important
in monetary transactions and security auditing.
6. Manageability – The security architecture should also provide management
capabilities for the above security functions. These may include, but are not limited to,
credential management, user management, and access control policy management.
7. Accountability – This includes secure logging and auditing which is also
required to support non-repudiation claims.
In addition other requirements necessary for a Service Oriented Architecture
(SOA) mentioned include security trust domain, interoperability, security policies and so
on.

2.2. STANDARDS AND HEURISTICS
Heuristics means “to guide” or “to pilot”, making it an important tool in
architecting since architecting is a form of piloting. Heuristics [12] are abstraction of
experience accumulated with a remarkable characteristic of it being passed on and used
in the future. It helps avoid the pit falls of yesteryears and reduces it’s time consuming
process. The formats of heuristics are words expresses in natural languages.
Heuristics provide non-analytical guidelines for treating complex, inherently
unbounded, ill-structured problems. They are used as aids in decision making, value
judgment and assessment. They are found throughout systems architecting, from earliest
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conceptualization through diagnosis and operation. They provide the successive transition
from qualitative, provisional needs to descriptive and prescriptive guidelines and, hence,
to rational approaches and methods [12].
Heuristics helps in risk reduction as well as provides lessons to teach in the
control of critical system features.
An example of a heuristics that applies to security architecting methodology is
“The greatest leverage in systems architecting is at the interface”. With this heuristics
attention is focused on the elements of security architecture and a structured methodology
is prescribed through it.
Systems standards, another important tool set allows for system/ interface
integration and interoperability. Examples of standards include the system specification,
interface description and interface management.
The Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) is a Department of Defense (DoD)
document [15] that provides standards, guidelines and specification for interoperability in
communications and weapon systems. These sets of commercial specifications are
provided in the areas of information processing, information transfer, modeling, message
format, user interface, and security that need to be applied to all new information
technology and national security systems.
In order to successfully overcome battlefield challenges, U.S. Forces will need to
operate in a fast, flexible and agile manner. The necessary ingredient for this to happen is
to provide quality information that can be shared without deterioration to enable sound
individual and collective judgments.
The key to achieving this is to ensure the timely reception of secure and accurate
data to the intended party. The intended party could range from the foot soldier of US
force or another unit of the armed forces to coalition forces of allied countries, including
aid agencies and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Achieving this information end-state will result in forces attaining Information
Superiority over potential adversaries. The JTA document came to exist because of the
need for interoperability between the various components involved in the ever changing
battlefield, including remote logistical and support operations.
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Interoperability is achieved when systems can provide and accept services from
other systems and can operate effectively together. Interoperability is defined by DoD as
“The condition achieved among communications electronics systems or items of
communications electronics equipment when information and services can be exchanged
directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability
should be defined when referring to specific cases”
JTA is intended as an open systems approach in designing weapons since it is not
possible to determine beforehand all the systems and components that will be involved in
any given battlefield.
The technical standards espoused by the JTA document is aimed at military
network enabled systems. Other network enabled systems such as the banking systems
also can benefit from standards and probably have in place technical standards
specification for interoperability of equipment. This provides some sort of security
measure for the system since any equipment that connects to the system must have the
technical standards prescribed, however this is not sufficient in offering a consistent
protection to the system in the event of a breach in security.
Both heuristics and standards are good tools in security architecture; however a
methodology is also required.

2.3. ARCHITECTURAL FRAMEWORKS
The Open Group [16] is international consortium of vendor-neutral buyers and
suppliers of technology. The main mission of this group is “to cause the development of a
viable global information infrastructure that is ubiquitous, trusted, reliable, and easy –touse. The Open Group creates an environment where all elements involved in technology
development can cooperate to deliver less costly and more flexible IT solutions”.
The Open Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF) evolved from the DoD’s
Technical Architecture Framework for Information Management (TAFIM).The
Architecture Forum of The Open Group whose key activities includes defining,
integrating and evolving standards to support Open systems is charged with developing
TOGAF since inception and has evolved continuously since the mid-90’s[16][17].

16
TOGAF

is

an

Enterprise

Architecture

framework

which

provides

a

comprehensive approach to the design, planning, implementation, and governance of
enterprise information architecture. This architecture is typically modeled at four levels
or domains; Business, Application, Data, Technology.
Unlike the DoDAF [18], the architectural description dictates what products to
assemble, further than the essential ones. Also TOGAF is iterative making it possible to
rework processes until a better one is assured. This is typically what security architecture
should be able to perform since it has been determined that security is dynamic. Figure
2.2 show that the phases navigate iteratively in a cycle. The circles represent the major
phases of building and maintaining the enterprise architecture using the ADM.
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Figure 2.2: TOGAF Enterprise Framework. Source: The Open Group
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Architectural frameworks also provide valuable tool for designing a security
architecture methodology, particularly TOGAF provides for iteration which is an added
value since security is dynamic and its methodology should also be dynamic to meet with
security changes.

2.4. SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR NATO NEC
Melrose & Madahar proposes a Layered Structure for an overarching security
architecture. In Figure 2.3 shown below they propose a framework for developing an
overarching NATO Networked Enabled Capability (NNEC) Architecture using a
previously performed NNEC Feasibility Study [19]. The framework consists of five
abstraction layers. The dashed line provides a notational view of Networking and
Information Infrastructure (NII). A NII reference architecture has been generated and
includes consideration of Information Assurance (IA) elements but at the technical level.
There is no dedicated security view within the architecture, or consideration of a business
driven top-down approach, which would satisfy some of the reasons security architecture
is necessary for Network Enabled Capability (NEC) mentioned previously {site
Introduction Relevance}. With a focus just on NII, there is a risk that the security aspects
of the architecture will be fragmented and not provide the required coherent enterprisewide picture.
Even though the focus has largely been on logical security of data, physical
security of equipment and infrastructures should not be overlooked. For the most part
satellite and other resources such as copper wire and submarine cables has been the
conduit for most of the network activities, albeit these resources are sometimes not
located in close proximity for supervision rendering it a possible target for mischievous
attackers. A very recent example can be seen in the destruction of an old satellite by the
Chinese, reminding us all that physical security for these resources will need to be
provided at some point.
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Figure 2.3: Framework for Development of an Overarching NNEC Architecture
Proposed by Melrose & Madahar
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3. METHODOLOGY

3.1. METHODOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
The methodology used in this thesis was to first describe in detail the different
concept requirements of what security architecture should consist. By following the listed
approach a methodology is developed, which is then applied in describing security
architecture for small scale net-centric operation of the University of Missouri-Rolla.
3.1.1. Security Architecture Development. In systems engineering, security
architecture means much more. Before delving into security architecture development,
there is a need to throw more light on the term “interoperability” since several
connotations can be drawn from different fields. Interoperability is the connecting of
people, data and diverse systems. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE) defines interoperability as the ability of two or more systems or components to
exchange information and to use the information that has been exchanged [20].
According to International Organization for Standardization and the International
Electrotechnical Commission ISO/IEC 2382-01, interoperability is defined as follows:
“The capability to communicate, execute programs, or transfer data among various
functional units in a manner that requires the user to have little or no knowledge of the
unique characteristics of those units”[21].
Therefore, interoperability describes the capability of different programs,
systems, units to exchange data, information or services through common sets of
procedures in order to provide services. Interoperability strongly implies that the product
or system be designed with standardization in mind.
Now because of all these connections going on, there is need to have an
architecture framework that caters for security. Security architecture in this context
embodies several concepts among which are:
(1) Providing both coherent and interoperability approach to security problem and
solution.
(2) Describing the relationships between different parts of security solution.
(3) Providing a guide as to how security solution can be achieved.
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Security architecture as a subset of architecture, specifically addresses elements
relevant to security-relevant issues. The security architecture is a strategic framework that
allows the alignment of an organizations development and operations effort. It is a
unifying framework that allows reusability of services that implement policy, standards,
and risk management decisions. In addition the security architecture allows for
improvements which may not be possible to make at a project level. At the architecture
level for instance, an architect can prospectively recognize the need to leverage a reusable
service for several projects instead for only a particular project, thereby saving cost in the
long run.
In summary, security architecture provides the framework and foundation to
enable secure communication, protect organization business processes and information
resources, and ensures that new methods for delivering service are secure.
3.1.2. Security Architecture Methodology.

The words “method” and

“methodology” indicate “a particular course of action.” Literally methodology entails
“the study of method”. Methods impress order. Actually the idea of using method in a
chaotic world is to glean the benefits of order it impresses [22].
The dictionary defines methodology as “a particular procedure or set of
procedures”. Checkland [23] writes “I take a methodology to be intermediate in status
between a philosophy…and a technique or method. A philosophy… might be…’political
action should aim at a redistribution of wealth in society,’…At the other extreme a
technique is a precise specific programme of action which will produce a desired result: if
you learn the appropriate technique and execute it adequately you can, with certainty,
solve a pair of simultaneous equations…A methodology will lack the precision of a
technique but will be a firmer guide to action than a philosophy. Where a technique tells
you ’how’ and a philosophy tells you ’what,’ a methodology will contain elements of
both ‘what’ and ‘how’”.
A methodology is defined as a codified set of practices, sometimes accompanied
by training materials, formal educational programs, worksheets, and diagramming tools
that can be carried out repeatedly to replicate a product or procedure. It can also be
defined as an organized, documented set of procedures and guidelines for one or more
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phases of the life cycle, such as analysis or design. Methodology usually includes
methods, procedures, and techniques involved in analyzing information.
A security architecture methodology therefore refers to sets of practices for
performing or defining security architecture in a coherent, consistent, accountable and
repeatable manner. It presents a package of practical ideas, principles, procedures and
proven practices that can be applied in the planning, design and development of security
measures in any large or small scale system.
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Figure 3.1: Architecture Development Methodology. Adapted from [9]

In designing a security architecture methodology, there are important terms that
are necessary in outlining security. Such as security services, security process, security
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management, security policy, risk management, security architecture and others. All these
are elaborated subsequently.
3.1.3. Security Architecture Methodology Requirement.

In designing any

system methodology, some key requirements need to be met. Several methods of
performing a requirements analysis for systems are available. However, each method has
its strengths and weaknesses; therefore a combination of several methods was used in this
requirements gathering to provide not only a broad range of usefulness, but represent
different approaches to the problem of gathering requirements. Critical Success Factor
(CSF) Analysis method and Usage Scenarios are the methods mostly used in this
analysis.
3.1.4. Critical Success Factors Analysis.

The concept of identifying and

applying Critical Success Factors (CSFs) dates back to the original notion of “success
factors” in D. Ronald Daniel’s [24] “Management Information Crisis”. Critical Success
Factor (CSF) as it is known today was expanded by John F. Rockhart [25], of MIT’s
Sloan School of Management, from Daniel’s work to specifically filter and identify the
information in the making of critical enterprise decisions.
In “A Primer on Critical Success Factors,” [26] Rockhart codified the ideology of
success factors as a way to systematically identify the information needs of executives. It
clearly specifies the essential steps of gathering and investigating data for the formation
of a set of organizational CSFs that can be used by executives to aid in organizational
administration. This document is generally thought to be the first account of the CSF
method.
Even though both Rockhart and Daniel focused on refining the information needs
of executives, Rockhart equally hinted at the value of the method as a component for the
strategic planning of information systems or technology. Therefore CSF method has been
used in many areas including in the technology planning methodologies in use today [27].
CSF used in this context is considered to be an essential component of a strategic
plan that must be achieved in addition to the organization’s goals and objectives. It is
important to make this subtle distinction because an organization’s CSFs should drive the
accomplishment of its mission.
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CSFs identify key performance areas that are crucial in order for an organization
or process to achieve its mission. Administrators or overseers of a project should know
and consider these key areas when they set goals, as they provide a common point of
reference for the entire organization or process, when they direct operational activities
and tasks that are important to achieving goals,. Thus, any activity or initiative that the
organization undertakes must ensure consistently high performance in these key areas;
otherwise, the organization may not be able to achieve its goals and consequently may
fail to accomplish its mission [27]. Therefore a good security architecture methodology
should outline key performance areas that should support strong security architecture.
Traditionally, strategic planning and managements’ definition of a goal or an
objective is moderately well known; conversely, characterizing CSF is not particularly
clear. Hence, CSFs are often confused with organizational goals. In this paper
organizational goals are defined as targets that are established to achieve the
organization’s mission. They are very specific as to what must be achieved, when it is to
be achieved, and by whom. Effective goals have a quantitative element that is measurable
to determine if the goal has been achieved. Goals can be decomposed into operational
activities to be performed throughout the organization.
CFS can be defined in many ways, these points to the elusive nature of CFS. The
Critical Success Factors analysis methodology is a top-down approach for determining
requirements based on the needs of the organization. The top-down approach makes CSF
a perfect tool, well-suited for determining requirements analysis for large systems with
many stakeholders and audiences with various interests and at times conflicting. CSFs are
those key or important things that need to be realized in order to achieve the goals. A
CSF for an organization or process in general is usually related to more than one goal.
Some of the merits of identifying CSFs are that;
•

They are simple to understand and help direct awareness to major concerns.

•

They are good method of communicating to workers, implementers and can be
easy to monitor.

•

They can be used in concert with strategic planning methodologies.
Identifying CSFs is extremely important because it keeps people focused and each

CSF should be measurable and associated with a target goal because things that are
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measured get done more often. Exact measures are not necessarily important, but they
provide guidelines.
The CSF analysis method starts off by determining the goal of the mission,
commonly termed mission statement, and then goes on to separate high-level goals of the
mission statement.
The high-level goals are then decomposed into Critical Success Factors, which are
then split into many levels of hierarchy, becoming more specific.
At the lowest level, each CSF becomes a requirement for the system; a single,
well-defined task that must be accomplished in order to be successful. Along the way,
problems to be solved and assumptions made are recorded.
Once the CSF hierarchy is established and a set of requirements has been derived,
these can then be arranged into a matrix for comparison with the problems identified. In
order to be considered complete, each problem must be fully addressed by one or more
requirements.
By analyzing the steps necessary to achieve success, and cross-referencing them
against problems to be solved, a complete set of requirements can be determined that can
then be correlated with specific user scenarios. Each of the requirements should apply to
at least one user scenario, and, generally, more than one.
This methodology allows requirements to be determined that satisfy the needs of
the organization and those of the user. Since architectural frameworks are built and
maintained by organizations, this method allows us to create a well-defined and
reasonably complete set of requirements.

3.2. THE ANALYSIS HIERARCHY
3.2.1. Mission.

The mission of the Security Architecture methodology is to

develop and maintain standard reference for designing and implementing any large scale
network-centric system.
It is important to note that the primary users of this document include
stakeholders, therefore the need to map the system’s stakeholders’ conceptual goals to a
logical view for security managers who need to make decisions on security, as well as
other audiences such as the information technology community and other
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managers/implementers who are developing security architectures for use as a reference
architecture.
3.2.2. Goals.

At the highest level, the goals of this security architecture

methodology can be divided into 5 categories. Each of which is related to the CSFs and
requirements which will be explained, where each of the top-level goal is further
elaborated.
It is also important to take cognizance of the fact that this security architecture
methodology covers the needs of enterprises that engage in net-centric activities, which
rely heavily on the information technology.
The Top-level Goals for the Security Architecture and its methodology are;
Reliability: The security architecture must be reliable and stable over time.
Critical success factor and requirement for this goal is enabling the security services to be
reliable, stable and evolvable over time.
Integratability: The security architecture must be consistent with current and
future needs of a security.
Scalability

and

Extensibility:

The

security

architecture

must

enable

implementations that are scalable and extensible.
Team Goals: The security architecture should meet the needs of the user
community. Critical success factor and requirement for this goal include; it should be
reliable, stable and evolve over time and it should be consistent and coherent
Management and Provisioning: The standard reference security architecture
should provide for manageable, accountable environment for security. Critical success
factor and requirement for this goal should be to enable the management and
provisioning for security.
3.2.3. Critical Success Factors for Security Architecture Methodology. The
list below shows the critical success factors needed for security architecture
methodology.
(1) It should provide guidelines for security policy & standards.
(2) It should provide guidelines for security management.
(3) It should provide risk assessment and management.
(4) Account for security services.
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(5) It should include security federation.
(6) Provide for security auditing.

3.3. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Security requirements identify types and levels of protection necessary for
equipment, data, information, applications, and facilities. Below are identified some key
requirements that must be met for a secure system. These requirements apply to a large
extent to information technology security, although it also applies to other environments
that require security. The objectives of security requirement are;
•

Ensure that users and client applications are identified and that their identities are
properly verified.

•

Ensure that users and client applications can only access data and services for
which they have been properly authorized.

•

Detect attempted intrusions by unauthorized persons and client applications.

•

Ensure that unauthorized malicious programs (e.g., viruses) do not infect the
application or component.

•

Ensure that communications and data are not intentionally corrupted.

•

Ensure that parties to interactions with the application or component cannot later
repudiate those interactions.

•

Ensure that confidential communications and data are kept private.

•

Enable security personnel to audit the status and usage of the security
mechanisms.

•

Ensure that applications and centers survive attack, possibly in degraded mode.

•

Ensure that centers and their components and personnel are protected against
destruction, damage, theft, or surreptitious replacement (e.g., due to vandalism,
sabotage, or terrorism).

•

Ensure that system maintenance does not unintentionally disrupt the security
mechanisms of the application, component, or center.
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Figure 3.2: Conceptual Enterprise Security Architecture. Adapted from [14]

3.3.1. Security Policy and Standards. Security policy refers to organizational
guidelines and principles that govern the system’s design, operation, and run time. The
security policy describes what is permissible in a system as well as what the system
cannot permit. Security standards should be prescriptive guidance for designing and
operating systems, and should be backed by reusable services wherever practical.
Security should not be regarded exclusively as an intermediary, but requires an
architecture and design advocate and backing at runtime.
Security policy and standards are not end goals in themselves, they need to be
backed by a governance model (federation) that ensures they are in use, and that it is
practically possible to build, deploy, and operate systems based on their intent. In practice
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this means that the security architecture must define reusable security services that allow
developers to not be security experts yet still build a secure system.
A security policy should not determine how a business operates; the nature of the
business should dictate the policy. Defining a company's security policy can seem
difficult, but by defining policy before choosing security methods, organizations can
avoid having to redesign security methodologies after they are implemented.
Security policies should map to an organization's business objectives, regulatory
issues and industry best practices enhancing their ability to implement strong information
security and avoid legal and regulatory liabilities. Security experts should work closely
with each organization to determine their unique business needs objectives, environments
and cultures. In addition, expertise and thorough understanding of current and future
regulatory, industry trends and globally accepted standards should be crafted into a policy
as it becomes available; this will lead to greater security, regulatory compliance and
enhanced business practices. Features of a balanced security policy are listed below.
•

Provides a comprehensive set of protection criteria based on the availability,
confidentiality and integrity requirements of the organization, in other words a
course of action should be provided.

•

Defines roles and responsibilities appropriate to an organization in support of the
protection policy developed, in other words a guiding principle based on
corporate policy.

•

Access to market-leading risk management and industry-best practices expertise.

•

Assists an organization in protection policy implementation, acceptance and
awareness.

•

Builds an enterprise policy framework that is manageable today and in the future.

•

Procedures that are considered expedient, prudent, advantageous, and productive
Benefits of a security policy
(a) Fast availability of a customized security policy.
(b) Provides an objective, expert assessment of current security policies.
(c) Provides the basis for establishing a security awareness program.
(d) Supports consensus building for security policy implementation.
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(e) Ensures compliance with security regulations and limits access to confidential
data.
(f) Lowers insurance premiums by reducing risks associated with adverse
security issues.
3.3.1.1 Effective security policies. Effective security policies should consider the
factors discussed in the following sections.
1. Identifying Resources
Clearly identifying organizations resources will focus attention to potential
adversaries who might want to undermine the organization, therefore organizations must
know what they want to protect, what access is needed, and how these consideration
work together. Security measures usually do not prevent unauthorized users from trying
to break security systems; they can only make it more difficult, therefore companies
should make a decision on what to focus on, the value of their assets or otherwise.
2. Cost Implications
Some security measures might inevitably diminish expediency, particularly for
advanced users. This might lead to the delay of work and may create costly overheads.
When instituting security policies, companies should weigh cost against the potential
benefits. Depending on the cost-benefit analysis, some infrastructures might be left
unprotected, if they do not have costly implications when compromised.
3. Identifying Assumptions
Making assumptions provides a starting point when designing a policy. For
example, an organization might assume that any user is savvy enough to break any
security code if they are dedicated. It is important to examine and justify assumptions;
any hidden assumption is a potential security hole.
4. Controlling Secrets
Passwords and encryption keys should be kept secrets. Most importantly, areas to
be protected need to be kept secret. Knowledge with which an organization’s security can
be circumvented should be guarded carefully to ensure that adversaries don’t get their
hands on it. The more secrets there are, the harder it will be to keep all of them. Security
systems should be designed so that only a limited number of secrets need to be kept.
5. Appreciate the Environment
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It is important to comprehend the functions of the system in the environment and
understand how each unit contributes to the system. This will help in identifying
abnormal behaviors and enable the setting of the proper security policy.
6. Physical Security
While logical security is important, physically securing an organization’s
resources is equally important. Security policy on who is granted physical access to any
resources should be emphasized.
7. Providing Pervasive Security
When changes are made to the system, the security policy should be upgraded to
encompass the change. This is especially true when new services are created. System
administrators, programmers, and users should consider the security implications of every
change they make. Understanding the security implications of a change takes practice; it
requires lateral thinking and a willingness to explore every way that a service could
potentially be manipulated. The goal of good security design and policy is to create an
environment that is not susceptible to every minor change.
Security policies are living documents, because organizations are constantly
subject to change, security policies must be systematically updated to reflect new
business directions, technological changes, and resource allocations.
3.3.1.2 Methodology for prescribing security policy and standards.

One

approach to setting security policies and procedures is suggested by the following steps:
(a) Identify all the assets that need to be protected.
(b) Identify all the vulnerabilities and threats and the likelihood of the threats
occurring.
(c) Look at what policy is currently available; if none exist develop one by
gathering information from various sources and applying it specifically to
organizational needs
(c) Decide which measures which will protect the assets in a cost-effective
manner.
(d) Communicate findings and results to the appropriate parties.
(e) Upgrade current policy and standards with most recent updates and make sure
to send out the people charged with implementation.
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(f) Implement the policy following the established guidelines. Example obtaining
user ID, verify user ID etc.
(g) Monitor and review the process continuously for improvement.
3.3.2. Security Risk Management.

Any security architecture methodology

should take into consideration risk management, as an important organizing concept.
Risk is comprised of assets, threats, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures. A risk
management centric approach allows for the security architecture to be agile in
responding to security needs. Risk is a function of threats exploiting vulnerabilities
against assets. The threats and vulnerabilities may be mitigated by deploying
countermeasures. The risk management process implements risk assessment to ensure the
systems’ risk exposure is in line with risk tolerance goals. This does not mean that
behavior is uniformly risk averse or risk seeking. The system should take on the
appropriate level of risk based on the set goals.
By building in risk management, any security risk that is breeched can be
undertaken by designing and deploying countermeasures that allow for sensible security
risk.
Risk management does not eliminate risks entirely, however its’ role in the
security architecture is to educate people about the risks they are taking and provide
countermeasures in the event that the undertaken risk does not suit the defined goals.
The dynamics encountered by organizations require that organizations sometimes
have to make decision on whether to embark on vulnerability-based or risk-based
approaches to security management. A risk-based approach has become the norm, which
features cost prominently, thereby allowing proper cost associations to be placed on
systems. The equation below properly defines the components involved in assessing risk.

Risk = (

Threats × Vu ln erabilitie s
Countermea sures

Figure 3.3: Risk Equation

) × Assets

32
Risk-based approaches have been used successfully in diverse areas such as
marine operations, building construction, financing and engineering to improve various
odds. Uncertainty is the main characteristics of risk.
The ability to utilize risk management successfully lies in the practical solutions
for dealing with this uncertainty. Documentations showing reduction in negative risks
that is attributed to the application of risk management abounds.
The emergence of risk management in the last fifty years as an interdisciplinary
field of study known as decision science is aimed at a formalized method to improve risk
reduction. This analytical approach which was initially applied to aircraft safety and
nuclear power has rapidly spread to other applications.
Risk management is a continuous process that assesses/mitigates risks.
Assessment is activity of identifying and analyzing risk. Probability (or likelihood) is
chance that risk will occur. Consequence is unfavorable result of risk. Mitigation is action
taken to lower probability and/or consequence of risk. Risk Level is numerical or
qualitative assessment of risk based on risk’s occurring probability and consequence.
Risk management constitute an iterative process involving five important step,
which are planning, identification, assessment, analysis and handling.
Several risk assessment methods exists, such as the R. von Solms’ [28] traditional
assessment vs. baseline control and the quantitative vs. qualitative bifurcation, all have
pros and cons. The Sandia report [22] discusses risk assessment method that is divided
into three archetypical approaches identified as “temporal”, “functional”, and
“comparative”, corresponding to stress testing, threat analysis and lifestyle, respectively.
However, in this paper attack trees was chosen in order to approach risk
assessment as a risk-based rather than as vulnerability-based.
3.3.2.1 Risk analysis utilizing attack trees. Risk analysis is a method used in
determining ways to in which risk can be eliminated or minimized. Possible solutions are
accomplished by utilizing trade-off studies and other analytical methods.
The term security really does not have a lot of meaning unless it is feasible to
determine how long security needs to be provided or who to provide security for. A good
method of going about securing a system is to model security threats against it. This
method provides insight and understanding to the diverse ways in which a system can be
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attacked, so that countermeasures can be designed to foil those attacks.

Also

understanding the means, motivations, and objectives of the attackers will go a long way
in helping to design better countermeasures to foil attempts by the attackers.
3.3.2.2 Attack trees and GSN. Attack trees [29] present a method for evaluating
the security of systems. They provide a method for the capture and reuse of the expertise
gained in security, and the ability to respond to changes in security. Since security is a
continuous process, attack trees provide a basis of understanding that process.
Attack trees make use of the Boolean logic to determine what needs to happen
before an attack on a node can occur, originating from one node and propagating through
the other nodes in the system. This is represented using a tree structure; with the goal
designated as the root node and the diverse methods of getting to the goal being
designated as the leaf nodes. The combination of attack trees and Goal Structuring
Notation (GSN) [29] technique provides better safety assurance for a system.
GSN is used in safety-critical industries to improve the structure, rigor, and
precision of safety arguments [29]. Figure 3.4 overleaf shows the combination of the two
techniques. It basically consists of three levels, the top most level is the Goal, the next is
the Strategy and the last level is the Solution. The Strategy level usually has sub goals.
From the structure it can be deduced that each level is successively decomposed
into the next level until a point is reached where nodes can be supported by direct
reference to available solutions [30]. The argument in diagram above can be summed up
with the “IF’ statement below.

IF {(Solution 1 OR Solution 2) OR/AND (Solution 1 AND Solution 2 AND Solution 3)]
} THEN Top Goal
In employing the attack tree model, value/cost is placed on each node. Another
method could be rating the vulnerability of each node. In the GSN attack tree [30] model,
each node is rated based on the risk assessment determined using a scale of one through
five where 1 corresponds to very low, 2 = low, 3 = moderate, 4 = high, and 5 = very high.
Analysis of the risk factor known as the Value At Risk (VAR), decisions on the
procedure to be undertaken can be made depending on the vulnerability.
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In determining the VAR, the attacker’s motive plays an important role, since it
influences the rating of the particular node. The VAR is set high if the attacker’s aim is
very important.
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Figure 3.4: Structure of an Attack Tree using GSN

3.3.2.3 Countermeasures, traceability and recovery mechanisms. In order to
deploy countermeasures on a compromised system, the security policy (which should be
robust and resilient) which has been developed for the system needs to be applied.
An Assurance Case arguing the security of critical system attributes contributes
significantly towards evaluating the VAR [31]. The NERC homepage has the guidelines
and best practices in detail, for developing an acceptable security policy [32].
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When and if an attack occurs, it is important to trace its source so that proper
measures can be deployed to counter such attacks in the future. The VAR should be set
higher if a trace is not possible due to its seriousness.
A prompt assessment of any damage to the system should be done and recovery
preformed using the damage recovery technique provided. Also the VAR on the
compromised node should be set to a lower value.
3.3.2.4 Methodology for prescribing security risk management. The itemized
below describes steps necessary to provide for security risk management.
(a) Identify risks
(b) Analyze risks
(c) Prioritize risks
(d) Define avoidance and alternate for each risk
(e) Define mitigation plan
(f) Define contingency plan
(g) Implement plan, track risk and revise risk management strategy.
3.3.3. Security Auditing. Auditing which usually means to formally conduct an
examination of vital components of an organization sometimes brings to memory images
of unending witch hunting in some organizations. However conducting an audit enables
an organization to take a second look at what they are doing thereby enabling them to
make better decisions.
Security audits are assessments of how the confidentiality, availability and
integrity of an organization's system are assured. Conducting a security audit is one of the
superb methods of determining whether an organization's security measures are effective
or not without incurring the cost and other associated damages of a security incident.
Security auditing specifies the extent to which a business, application, component,
or center shall enable security personnel to audit the status and use of its security
mechanisms.
Security audit is also a systematic, measurable technical assessment of how the
organization's security policy is employed at a specific site. It involves providing
independent evaluations of an organization’s policies, procedures, standards, measures,
and practices for safeguarding any information both electronic and otherwise from loss,
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damage, unintended disclosure, or denial of availability. The broadest scope of work
includes the assessment of general and application controls.
Security auditors work with the full knowledge of the organization, at times with
considerable inside information, in order to understand the resources to be audited.
Security auditors work by conducting personal interviews, vulnerability scans,
examination of the organization’s system settings, analyses of networks, and historical
data.
Security audits are part of an on-going process of defining and maintaining
effective security policies. It should involve constant iteration using the feedback derived
from the processes. It involves everyone who uses any security related resources
throughout the organization. Security audits provide the tool that enables a fair and
measurable way to examine how secure a site really is.
The current state of technology requires audit steps that relate to testing controls
of access paths resulting from the connectivity of local-area networks, wide-area
networks, intranet, Internet, etc., in the IT environment.
3.3.3.1 Objectives of security auditing. Typical objectives of security auditing
are to ensure the collection, analyzing, and reporting of information about the:
•

Status (e.g., enabled vs. disabled, updated versions) of its security mechanisms.

•

Use of its security mechanisms (e.g., access and modification by security
personnel).
An example of security auditing is an application that can collect, organize,

summarize, and regularly report the status of its security mechanisms Identification,
Authentication, Authorization, Immunity, Privacy, and Intrusion Detection. Security
mechanism for security auditing should be implemented using mechanisms like audit
trails and event logs.
The results of these evaluations are generally directed to the organization’s
management, legislative bodies, or other auditors. Information security auditing may be
performed in engagements where
•

The specific audit objective is to evaluate security, or

•

The audit objectives are much broader, but evaluating security is a necessary
subset. (For example, an audit objective such as financial statement assurance or
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program evaluation frequently may be met only when there is assurance that the
security of the financial or program data is adequate.)
3.3.3.2 Methodology for prescribing security auditing. The itemized below
describes steps necessary to provide for security auditing.
(a) Congregate an audit team from the accounts and IT departments.
(b) Define the scope of audit by creating assets list and security perimeter.
(c) Create a threat list, examine threat history and check security trends & past
audits. (d) Review current policies. (e) Perform a survey of the site. (f) Use
questionnaires where necessary. (g) Develop audit plan/checklist.
(h) Meet with site managers to determine what data will be collected, how/when
will it be collected, site employee involvement, and answer questions
(i) Report findings and update security policy.
3.3.4. Security Domain Federation. Network security environments consist of
dissimilar or diverse constituents. The political concept of "federation" takes on new
meaning due to these diverse constituents. The arrangement in which no one group or
organization manages all users and resources in a distributed application environment is
describes as federation. In this scenario, administrators in diverse domains enact local
security policies that support the mutual benefits of transactions among their respective
area of operation.
The word federation originates from the Latin word trust hence its tie to the trust
domain. In distributed network services, federation refers to the need for trust agreements
among decentralized security and policy domains.
Federation allows access-management functions to span sundry organizations,
business units, sites, platforms, products and applications. Federation necessitates that an
organization trust other site administrators to validate its own users' identities. A
federated environment, allows users to log on and access resources transparently in
external domains that are subject to various policies defined by both internal and external
administrators.
Users can log on through authentication techniques either through an ID/password
or Kerberos, and this authentication is communicated to a federated destination site
through an authentication assertion. Kerberos is a computer network authentication

38
protocol, which allows individuals communicating over an insecure network to prove
their identity to one another in a secure manner. It requires a trusted third party.
Federation provides the mechanisms for cooperation between different
interworking network domains possibly owned by different administrators. In order to be
able to offer services to their users, these administrators must cooperate.
Security federation specifically refers to an approach that requires a centralized
focus on security issues. Federated security enables collaboration across multiple
systems, networks, and organizations in different trust realms. It is a mechanism that
allows for clean separation between a service and its associated authentication and
authorization procedures for clients consuming the service. Three key elements of
federated security architecture are:
Domain/Realm: This can be a single unit of security administration or trust. A
typical domain might include a single organization.
Federation: A collection of domains that have established trust. The level of trust
may vary, but typically includes authentication and almost always includes authorization.
A typical federation might include a number of organizations that have established trust
for shared access to a set of resources.
Security Token Service: A Web service that issues security tokens; that is, makes
assertions based on evidence that it trusts, to whoever trusts it. This forms the basis of
trust brokering between domains. The Figure 3.5 below illustrates an example of
federated security.
In this scenario, there are two organizations: A and B. Organization B has a Web
resource (a Web service), that is of some value to users in organization A.
3.3.4.1 Trust domain. Trust is important both in people’s daily lives and in
networks, because it gives peace of mind to the system administrator that unauthorized
users can be kept away. Quoting Sen. Chuck Hagel, R-Neb., “... We govern with one
currency, and that's trust. And that trust is all important. And when you lose or debase
that currency, then you can't govern……….."
Interoperability and connectivity needs of equipment in a net-centric environment
raise trust issues, and trust management becomes pertinent. Trust is essential in
distributed and net-centric systems because of the need to allow resource sharing,
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concurrent processing and operations. Communications in these systems traverse
domains and organizations, and same trust level differ for each of the domains. Yet,
within the same domain, users’ trustworthiness can diverge.
Parties involved in the trust include but not limited to the different services of the
armed forces, the platforms, equipment, personnel, logistics support, contractors that
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currently rely or intends to rely on networked environment enhanced by advances in
information technology.
Various dictionaries define trust as an assured or firm reliance on character,
integrity, ability, strength or truthfulness of a person or something. Another definition of
trust is the belief that an entity is capable of acting reliably, dependably and securely in a
particular case. [33].
Trust management on the other hand is a “unified approach to specifying and
interpreting security policies, credentials, and relationships that allows direct
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authorization of security-critical actions.” [34]. Trust management is the collecting of all
the necessary information used in establishing trust in a relationship, while continuing in
the monitoring and adjustment of existing trust relationships[35].
A flexible and general-purpose trust management system can help maintain
current and consistent credibility information for the different entities in a net-centric
system.
A trust management system unites the concept of security policy specification
with the method for specifying security credentials. Credentials describe specific
delegations of trust. Trust management credentials relate directly to authorizations to
perform specific tasks. Trust management systems support delegation, and policy
specification and refinement at the different layers of a policy hierarchy, thereby
implementing consistency and scalability. In addition, trust-management systems are by
design extensible and can express policies for different types of applications.
The trust management approach, initiated by Blaze et al. [34] requires that “the
set C of credentials prove that the request r complies with the local security policy P”.
Each entity that receives requests must have a policy that serves as the ultimate source of
authority in the local environment. The policy may directly authorize certain actions to be
taken, but more typically it will delegate this responsibility to credential issuers that it is
certain to have the required domain expertise as well as relationships with potential
requesters.
The trust-management engine is a separate system component that takes (r, C, P)
as input, outputs a decision about whether compliance with policy has been proven, and
may also output some additional information about how to proceed if it has not been met.
Proofs of compliance can be determined by the use of a general purpose,
application-independent algorithm which is an important part of a trust-management
approach. This is a good idea since any product or service that requires some form of
proof that compliance with policies has been met could use a special purpose algorithm
implemented from scratch. The advantage of using a general-purpose compliance
regulator lay in its soundness and reliability of both the definition and the implementation
of “proof of compliance.”
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A compliance regulator of a general-purpose nature can be explained, formalized,
proven correct, and implemented in a standard package, and answers returned for any
given input (r,C, P) depends only on the input and not on any implicit policy decisions in
the design or implementation of the compliance regulator. However, in order to design
this sort of a trust-management engine some ground rules need to be provided. They are:
– A definition of “proof of compliance”
– Policies and credentials should be fully defined
–Responsibility should be assigned between the trust-management engine and the
calling application. For example the application may obtain all credentials needed for the
compliance proof before the trust management engine is invoked, or the trustmanagement engine may obtain additional credentials while it is still constructing a
proof.
Distributed systems imply that the systems are located at different places possibly
in time and space. It is a collection of independent computers/systems that appears to its
users as a single coherent system. In order for these systems to work together they need
to communicate through the use of networking resources. Because they are not physically
accessible, there has to be some way of verifying that indeed it is the right equipment
when they try to make contact with other distributed systems, therefore the need for trust
models.
Need for Trust Management
The list below [35] describes the reasons for trust requirements for security in a
distributed system.
Authentication: The identity of users in a distributed system is often not well
known. Hence the need for some form of authentication to be performed before the
decision to grant access can be made. On average, authentication is achieved through a
username/password
insufficient

in

mechanism.

networked

Straightforward

computing

password-based

environments,

however,

protocols
even

are

against

unsophisticated adversaries; simple eavesdropping can destroy security. Other
mechanisms include:
• One-Time passwords, which do not secure the rest of the session.
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• Centralized ticket-based systems, such as Kerberos [36]. Problems with such
systems include the necessity for an authentication server (and for frequent
communication with it) and implicit trust assumptions.
• Public-key based authentication protocols, which are considered the “state of the
art” for scalable authentication systems.
Delegation: Scalability in distributed system is dependent on delegation. It
enables decentralization of administrative tasks. Existing distributed-system security
mechanisms usually delegate directly to a “certified entity.” In such systems, policy (or
authorizations) may only be specified at the last step in the delegation chain (the entity
enforcing policy). The implication is that high-level administrative authorities cannot
directly specify overall security policy; rather, all they can do is “certify” lower-level
authorities. This authorization structure leads easily to inconsistencies among locallyspecified sub-policies.
Local trust policy: The number of administrative entities in a distributed system
can be quite large. Each of these entities may have a different trust model for different
users and other entities. For example, system A may trust system B to authenticate its
users correctly, but not system C; on the other hand, system B may trust system C. It
follows that the security mechanism should enforce uniform and implicit policies and
trust relations.
A trust model for distributed systems can be illustrated using various trust models,
such as public key cryptography, the resurrecting duckling model, and the distributed
trust model. These models will be briefly discussed and its relationship to security will be
explored.
3.3.4.2 Trust models. Below are some trust models used currently in peer-topeer systems and other networks.
Public Key Cryptography or Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) was one of
the early standards proposed for distributed trust management. It implicitly utilizes trust
management concept by identifying and authenticating parties seeking to establish
contact.
Resurrecting duckling model is a hierarchical structure with a master-slave
relationship. The mother duck is described as the master entity while the duckling is the
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slave entity. Instruction or the secret key is passed from the master entity through a secret
channel to the slave entity. A slave entity can in turn become a master entity when it
passes a secret key called imprinting to another entity.
Distributed trust model is based on “conditional transitivity of trust” [33] which
simply put means that trust is transitive under some condition. [37] This model relates to
the human society where trust is generated by both direct and indirect interactions. That
is, entities can obtain information and recommendations from other sources other than the
main source. However because recommendations have uncertainty or risk, entities need
to know how to cope.
Two types of distributed trust model exist based on asymmetry; they are direct
trust and recommender trust. Trust relationship is grouped between the two entities in
terms of different interactions. Trust in one group does not depend on trust in the other
group. The model utilizes continuous trust values for direct trust and recommender trust,
depicted in the tables shown below.

Table 3.1. Direct Trust Value
Value

Meaning

Explanation

-1

Distrust

Completely untrustworthy

0

Ignorance

Can't decide

1

Minimal

Lowest trust

2

Average

Mean trustworthiness

3

Good

Trusted by major population

4

Complete

Fully trustworthy

Table 3.2. Recommender Trust Value
Value

Meaning

Explanation

-1

Distrust

Completely untrustworthy

0

Ignorance

Can't decide

1

Minimal

2

Average

3

Good

4

Complete

The entity itself judges the
reliability of recommender's
recommendation
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The recommendation protocol is straightforward. For example, entity A needs a
service from entity D (say joint coalition force). Now, A knows nothing about the
trustworthiness of D’s service, so A asks B for a recommendation with respect to the
possibility of joint coalition in the near future, assuming A trusts B’s recommendation
within this category. When B receives this request and finds that it doesn’t know D
either, B forwards A’s request to C, which has D’s trustworthiness information within
joint operations. C sends a reply to A with D’s trust value. The path A _ B _ C _ D is said
to be the recommendation path.
The following formula is used to calculate the trust value from the returned
value1: tv_T = [rtv(1)/4] _ [rtv(2)/4] _ ... _ [rtv(i)/4] _ ... _ [rtv(n)/4] ? tv(T), where rtv(i)
is the trust value of the ith recommender in the recommendation path, tv(T) is the trust
value of target T returned by the last recommender, and tv_T is the calculated trust value
of target T. When multiple recommendation paths exist between the requester and the
target, the target’s eventual trust value is the average of the values calculated from
different paths.
This model exhibits some weaknesses discussed below:
•

The model does not consider false recommendations and assumes that a
recommender with a good recommender trust value always makes reliable
recommendations, which might not be true.

•

The model does not provide a mechanism for monitoring and reevaluating trust,
which is dynamic.
Binary concept of true or false should not be used in trust management since trust

is relative. Abdul-Rahman and Hailes[37] quantify trust as a multiple value concept.
Several other trust management systems apply similar method. To curtail the possibility
of the wrong trust recommendations, the trust model is grouped in two
•

Evidence-based model, here entities create trust relationships based on some
previous evidence, such as keys [38] [39] [40];

•

Recommendation-based model, here recommendations from intermediaries
establish the trust relationship between two strangers. Trust management systems
for distributed systems can be placed into these two categories.
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3.3.4.3 Recommendation-based trust management. The previously mentioned
study conducted by Xiong and Liu on trust management in distributed peer-to-peer
systems was based on feedback or recommendations of unknown or unfamiliar peers.
While P2P systems involves entities that may not know each other from Adam, they
entities that will use the JTA most likely know each other but may not have worked
tighter. Thus, a slight twist to the equation for this study. However, the recommendationbased trust model can be applied to this study when some of entities involved may have
worked together previously.
Xiong and Liu define a satisfactory interaction as 1 and a complaint as 0 in their
trust metric below. Applying this equation to this gives the following:

T (u , t ) =

∑ S (u , v , t ).Cr ( v , t )
∑ I (u , v , t )

v∈ P , v ≠ u

(1)

v∈ P , v ≠ u

where
• P is a set of entities in the system;
• u and v are entities in the system, u, v _ P;
• S(u,v,t) is the degree of satisfaction that u has with v until the tth transaction;
• T(u,t) is u’s trust value evaluated by other entities until the tth transaction;
• Cr(v,t) is the balance factor for filtering feedback from v; and
• I(u,v,t) is the number of interactions that u has with v up to the tth transaction.
Therefore, T(u,t) is the ratio of the cumulative weighted satisfaction that u
receives to the total number of interactions that u has within the system.
S(u,v,t) _ Cr(v,t) by I(u,v,t) – C(u,v,t) _T(v,t). C(u,v,t) is an approximation which
shows the degree of complaint filed by v against u. and C(u,v,t) _ T(v,t) indicates the
filtered complaint filed by v against u. T(u,t) becomes:

T (u , t ) = 1 −

∑ C ( u , v , t ).T ( v , t )
∑ I (u , v , t )

v∈ P , v ≠ u

v∈ P , v ≠ u

(2)
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T(u,t) falls within the range of (0, 1) as prescribed by Xiong and Liu . The higher
T(u,t) is, the more trustworthy u is. This approach uses v’s trust value T(v,t) as a balance
factor. The higher T(v,t) is, the more reliable v’s complaint is. Thus v’s complaint has
more impact on u’s trust value. The trustworthiness decision criterion is:
If I(u,t) > C1 and T(u,t) > C2, then u is trustworthy.
C1 and C2 are thresholds, with C1 defining the minimum number of interactions
required. Obviously, a certain number of interactions are necessary to improve accuracy.
Xiong and Liu’s approach considered both positive and negative evaluations and
interaction history, and therefore more likely to produce accurate results. Some drawback
associated with this trust management system is explained below:
•

A minimum number of interactions are required in equation two’s decision
criteria, therefore a possible disadvantage for an entity which has not worked with
any one of the group in the system.

•

Equation one uses a balance factor which is a trust value assigned by one the
entities the system assumes that an entity with a higher trust value always gives
more reliable feedback than an entity with a lower trust value, which might not be
true.

•

There may come a time when the entity’s behavior may change due to prevailing
circumstance. The most recent feedback will be closer to the entity’s current
behavior than older feedback; however this model utilized same weight in
evaluating an entity’s trust.
A similar trust management system utilizes feedback to evaluate trust value;

however, it only considers complaints making the system too sensitive to misbehavior.
Decision is made by using probabilistic method to analyze complaints.
Security policy and standards normally dictates standards that all equipment
interacting with its’ system should adopt. This can be translated as a sign to promote trust
among genuine systems wishing to utilize the capabilities of a system in a networked
environment. However, there is a need to use the trust model and trust management
concept.
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3.3.5. Security Management. [27] Relates that managing security is one of the
many problems that confronts organizations and must be resolved in order for its mission
to be accomplished. Regardless of the assets that need securing—information or technical
assets, physical plant, or personnel—a security strategy that can be deployed, measured,
and modified as becomes necessary is a must have for the organization. The effectiveness
of any security strategy depends on how well it fits with the CSFs as well as the
organizations’ other missions.
When problems traverse an organization, it poses many management challenges,
especially when it concerns security. First and foremost the areas of import should be
identified and targeted. This requires the organization to take an inventory to determine
what needs to be protected and why. In a large, complex organization, this can result in
the identification of hundreds of assets that are important to strategic drivers. Next, in
order to secure these assets special skills and resources will be required, typically
scattered throughout the organization. Because security is a concern for the whole
organization, its’ management is no longer seen as a sole proprietary of information
technology department.
Security issues are becoming increasingly complex, and the need for a single,
centralized point of management is becoming increasingly necessary. As the threat in the
environment grows, compliance issues are making it essential to secure an everincreasing perimeter.
A centralized philosophy of management needs to be adopted, backed by a robust
security infrastructure with immediate Event Management responsiveness, and backed by
Information Management long-term configuration and log analysis support.
Security management is further discussed by looking at two equally important
subfunctions, security services and security processes.
3.3.5.1 Security services. Security services provide confidentiality, integrity, and
availability services for a

platform. Security services are implemented as protection

services, such as authentication and authorization, detection services, such as monitoring
and auditing, and response services, such as incident response and forensics. These
services have served as the goals and objectives for information security programs for
many years, but they do not provide an actionable blueprint as such. Later on in this
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document, a method to map these security services into an overall security architecture
plan will be described.
Security services can also be described as those services that support access
control on objects and non-repudiation of operations on objects. Access control is defined
as a Security service that gives admittance to a user. Non-repudiation, which is also a
security service, provides proof that an action was carried out by a particular user at a
particular time.
3.3.5.2 Security services and strengths required. The security services and
strengths required for network protection are discussed below.
Authentication: Authentication of all personnel in this domain is required.
Access Control: Access to data objects in this domain shall be granted on an
individual basis. Access control shall restrict functions available for all data sets on
example documents. Individuals filing research documents shall have read access only to
data sets pertaining to pending actions. Government personnel processing the documents
shall have read access to all data sets in this domain and read/write access to their
assigned documents.
Data Integrity: Data integrity shall be provided for all information within the
domain.
Confidentiality: Not mandatory for document filings but the capability is required
as a choice should the filer so require. Required for all document processing done by the
Government after receipt.
Non-Repudiation: Not required for document filing but the capability is required
as a choice. Required for all Government initiated actions pertaining to pending
document actions. Individuals must be positively identified and time stamping for
electronic document filing actions is required.
Audit: All access to the systems within the domain to modify data objects shall be
audited.
Availability: Since DOCT is a research and development system, specific
availability mechanisms will not be implemented.
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Attribute Services
Various attributes are needed to support policy-based decisions. These attributes
are those of the principals, the system resources, and the application environment. This
service group provides standard access mechanisms for such attributes, and defines how
attribute queries are returned.
Principal Attribute Service – provides query and retrieval interfaces to access
attributes for principals, which may be individuals or even organizations. The attribute
taxonomy or “schema” is not defined by the service, but rather by the underlying attribute
authorities (e.g. identity stores). These attributes are retrieved and provided upon request
and may be used as inputs to the policy decision logic
Other attribute services are Resource Attribute Service for retrieving resources,
Environment Attribute Service for retrieving environment attributes and Attribute
Administration services to actively manage the attributes.
Credential Services
Credential service provides identification and recommendation that enables
subscribers participate in electronic transactions. It provides access to the underlying
security infrastructure. If a credential service provider offers more than one type of
credential then each one is considered a separate credential service. Some of the services
included in credential service include:
•

Certificate Validation Service (CVS) – CVS makes it possible for clients to assign
part or all certificate validation responsibilities. This is particularly important for
clients who do not have the capability for Public Key Processing (PKI).

•

Certificate Registration Service – Public Key certificates are necessary to utilize
digital signatures and encryption. Assuming that clients generate their own
public/private key pair, their equivalent certificates need to be generated, hence
the need for a certificate registration service. This services the required protocol
that enables the use of the public/primary key system.

•

Certificate Retrieval Service (CRS) – CRS helps provides authentication
verification, digital signature verification, and public key encryption operations
for users and clients alike.
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3.3.5.3 Security process. Risk management, security policy and standards, and
security architecture govern the security processes and defense in depth architecture
through design guidance, runtime support, and assurance services. Security metrics are
used for decision support for risk management, security policy and standards, and
security architecture. The security architecture should have a reference implementation
for developers and other IT staff to review what functions the security mechanisms
performs, and how they do it.
Security processes carry out the intent of the system risk management, security
policy and standards, and security architecture. They are broken into discrete domains
because they solve very different problems, and require different staffing, support
models, and success criteria.

3.4. OVERARCHING METHODOLOGY FOR SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
(1) Create security policy & standards by
(a) Identify all the assets that need to be protected.
(b) Identify all the vulnerabilities and threats and the likelihood of the
threats occurring.
(c) Look at what is currently available; if none exist develop one gathering
information from various sources and applying it specifically to
organizational needs
(c) Decide which measures which will protect the assets in a cost-effective
manner.
(d) Communicate findings and results to the appropriate parties.
(e) Upgrade current policy and standards with most recent updates and
make sure to send out the people charged with implementation.
(f) Implement the policy following the established guidelines. Example
obtaining user ID, verify user ID etc.
(g) Monitoring and review the process continuously for improvement.
(h) Adopt technical standards where necessary
(i) Ensure that users comply by providing access to information on ways
to procure and install/implement.
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(2) Establish security federation for the organization by
(a) Designing trust models
(b)Devise procedures for establishing trust.
(3) Establish a risk management approach including
(a) Identify risks (b) Analyze risks (c) Prioritize risks (d) Define avoidance
and an alternate for each risk (e) Define mitigation plan (f) Define
contingency plan (g) Implement plan (h) Track risk (i) Revise risk
management
(4) Incorporate security auditing process
(5) Security management process is necessary to ensure that all the security
services and processes are co-coordinated properly.
Figure 3.6 below depicts the methodology diagram consisting of the five elements
discussed and their relationships.

Stakeholder Goals

Security Policy

Security Risk

Security Auditing

Management

Security Services
Security Process
Trust domain

Security

Security Federation

Management
Assurance

Figure 3.6: Security Architecture Methodology Process.
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4. THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-ROLLA SYSTEM

The University of Missouri-Rolla (UMR) is one of four campuses in the
University of Missouri System. The university is a research school that offers educational
programs in major engineering and other scientific disciplines that are technology-based,
technology-dependent, or which support these programs. UMR has a student population
of over 5000 each semester in about 2,160,199 gross sq.ft. acreage. Classes are held at the
main campus in Rolla and at several off campus locations. Also the advances afforded by
information technology have made it possible for students to enroll and attend classes
virtually from all parts of the globe; nearly 100 classes are taught via distance education
in each of the fall and spring semesters. This trend has ensured that UMR is among the
higher education institutions with net-centric capability. This, in turn, has presented the
UMR IT department some challenges, one of which is designing a security architecture
for its net-centric system.
There is no one single solution for a security architecture for a net-centric
capability in a higher education institution such as UMR, but using the common elements
of security architecture for NEC developed in the previous sections, a suitable plan of
action can be developed for UMR. This security architecture needs to be reviewed
periodically and updated as needed or as a result of security audit reports.

4.1. CHALLENGES FACED BY UMR IT SECURITY
Universities and other higher education institutions such as UMR have networks
that are frequently open, to facilitate collaboration between students, faculties and
research organizations that are not on the campus. This also means that computers from
off campus sites which connect to the university’s network might already be
compromised, making it a lot easier for viruses, worms, and other malicious software to
spread throughout the network. Therefore both outside (off campus) and inside (oncampus) threat issues will need to be considered.
Also open networks which allow computers outside the campus to connect to the
campus networks are more susceptible to hackers than computers in corporate networks
as depicted by a test at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC) and
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similar test at other universities which show that security can be compromised in a matter
of hours. T This is because the open, collaborative network environments at universities
are seen as easy targets by the hackers [41].
Another challenge is that UMR has over 6500 students and faculty, who may have
little or no training in good system administration practices, each possibly using
individual computers/laptops.
Because IT infrastructures are constantly evolving, it therefore means that a
security architecture can never be complete and will need revising at intervals. On the
other hand, this constant change can be advantageous since it may present opportunities
to leverage new technologies.
Viruses are written to achieve the most possible damage and reach the widest
possible audience; in most institutions, Microsoft operating system and Microsoft
software suite are used, therefore devising a security architecture that puts focus on this
will be of immense advantage.

4.2. PROBLEM DEFINITION
The problem faced by UMR can be viewed from two perspectives: network
protection and information protection. As stated in the challenges above, a major problem
for UMR is how best to secure the information in an open network. How best to assure
users that the information going through the network is secure without infringing on the
rights and expectations for an open network. Another requirement of similar importance
is how to protect the network from attacks that might cripple the network.
In order to tackle this problem, a first step is to assess the mission statement,
which includes both the use policy and the e-mail policy.

4.3. REASONS TO IMPLEMENT SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
(1) Information Protection: to assure that the information on students, staff, and
faculty is not accessed by unauthorized persons.
(2) Intellectual Property: to ensure that only authorized students/faculty/staff can
access course materials.
(3) Integrity: to ensure the integrity of data stored in accounts.
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(4) Access Control:

To protect computers inside the perimeter protected by

traditional firewalls.

4.4. CURRENT SECURITY APPROACH AT UMR
Currently, there is no specific approach or single document utilized by UMR,
rather the security policy and activities are scattered throughout different areas. One
example of a security approach in place is to give several privilege levels to students and
others. Subsequent paragraphs compares UMR security architecture with the five security
architecture elements developed in this thesis.
UMR appears to have three levels of policy and standards: an IT policy, a UMR
policy and an overarching UM System policy. The policy and standards are good first
steps; however, they can and should be improved. One very positive step that UMR has
taken over the past few years is the appointment of a full-time Information Security
Officer.

There is also an IT Coordination Committee which reviews progress and

policies.
UMR IT performs a qualitative risk assessment by performing a daily threat
analysis. They also use an Educause tool, which is vulnerability analysis software for
residual risk examination. They have seen a 10%-19% increase in improvement in their
ability to detect threat.
UMR IT does not use external auditors to audit the network; rather they keep a
main log and monitor accounts periodically. The entire University of Missouri System
conducted an internal audit several years ago which led to more consistent policies across
all four campuses. At UMR, students accounts are usually left for 6-12 months after the
students graduate; employee accounts are frozen immediately upon leaving UMR and all
privileged are revoked.
For federation, they rely wholly on recommendation-based trust in allowing
network users access. There is a plan in the works to use shibboleth in the future for a
federated identity based authentication and authorization. Shibboleth will allow for
information about users in one security domain to be provided to other organizations in a
common federation, which will provide cross-domain single sign-on identification
(SSID) and will remove the need for content providers to maintain usernames and

55
passwords/passphrases. Identity providers supply user information, while service
providers consume this information and gate access to secure content.
In the management area, UMR has a business impact analysis assessment process
which consists of business continuity and disaster recovery techniques, recovery time
objectives, reliability goals, multiple feeds to pick up slack time (that is, the utilize
redundancy so that no time is lost in the event of a recovery) and assets recovery (which
is not yet available).

4.5. USERS OF THE NETWORK
There are diverse usages of the UMR network and users’ privileges vary. Some
users have only a basic privilege, while others have very high level privileges. The
network use by student ranges from entertainment to research; therefore they are given
the basic of privileges.
The next usage level is for educational use by faculty and research professionals
and they have a higher level privilege. There are research users whose privilege ranges
from low to extremely critical. There is also business usage by administrators within the
UM System office; they have high to critical privilege. The network is also used for
distance education where there are several privilege ranges. There are also staff users.
There are external users of the network, one of which is the United States
Geological Survey (USGS). USGS uses it for rapid access mapping for rescue operations.
All these users require different trust and privilege levels.

4.6. IDENTIFYING RESOURCES TO PROTECT
Human Resources Office: This office collects and maintains information on all
persons employed by the university, including their social security number which can
easily be used by identity thieves to ruin a person’s credit. Therefore protection of all
computers in this office is a must and should reside at a high level.
Accounts Department: This office is equally important because it keeps records of
all account information of students. If a computer in this office is compromised it can
make it impossible to determine who has paid fees and who has not.
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Email Server: Emails are so prolific today that younger generations must wander
how older generations thrived without it. Likewise its usage on campus are enormous.
Users are entitled some degree of assurance that their emails are sent only to the intended
party and nowhere else.
Research Computers: Research is the bedrock of most institutions and successful
research is critical to institutions such as UMR. Therefore it is important that research
computers are not compromised whether to destroy or steal information and intellectual
property.
Other Computers: Other computers in the system also need to be protected since
some of them can log in to some of the other mentioned computers.
Network: The network is the conduit through which all these computers
communicate. Constant monitoring of the network is necessary to locate lapses and
intruders and to identify malicious activity of insiders within the network.

4.7. IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS
There are five elements of a security architecture as developed in this thesis;
therefore the focus is on the elements of most importance for UMR with its open
network. It is important to note that all five elements are necessary for successful security
architecture; however some elements will be stressed more than others. Given the
resources identified above as deserving protection, the categories into which they fall are
examined closely, starting with security risk management and ending with security policy
& standards.
4.7.1. Security Risk Management. Security risk management is important as
already highlighted, more so for an open network such as ones found in UMR. Therefore
more work can be done in this area in order to ensure the integrity of the network. Using
the attack tree methodology as described in this thesis would enable and promote a
rigorous security risk management plan for UMR network.
4.7.2. Security Audits. Even though logs are maintained and accounts monitored
periodically, there is a need for an external auditor who will provide an objective
approach different from what is obtained internally. External auditors can provide
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unbiased audits that will enable the discovery of vulnerabilities that may lead to the
revision of the security policy and standards.
4.7.3. Security Federation. The future use of the shibboleth system and any
other trust model will surely be beneficial to the UMR network. The use of the network
by the USGS might raise the trust level; therefore, in addition to the recommendationbased trust; the use of other trust models mentioned in this thesis will be needed in order
to have a good grasp of the federation required.
4.7.4. Security Management: Security Services & Security Process.

The

UMR IT Office already utilizes various techniques in security management, one of which
is the assignment of various privilege levels to categories of users. In the future, as they
implement the shibboleth program, there will be a need for attribute and credential
services. There will also be a need to improve access control to restrict access to some
network sites by the anticipated users from other colleges and institutions. In addition, a
documentation of the procedure on Event Management responsiveness, backed by
Information Management long-term configuration and log analysis support, will go a
long way in providing a starting point for security officers in the future.
4.7.5. Security Policy and Standards. The security policy’s hierarchy is thus
UM System: UMR: IT [42]. These policies and procedures are quite extensive. As more
improvements are made to the network, it will to be updated, especially after audits are
completed.

4.8. OVERARCHING METHODOLOGY
•

Gather information about network security strategy, technology, policy, and
devices

•

Analyze network security architecture and design

•

Identify, confirm, and reduce vulnerabilities in network security architecture,
devices, and features

•

Document security risk analysis and provide recommendations

•

Provide an onsite presentation of findings and prioritized recommendations.

•

Revise security policy and standard where needed.
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

This research proposed a security architecture for network enabled systems using
five elements and further prescribed a security architecture methodology by leveraging
these five elements. The security architecture while similar to [14] draws from several
sources with an added methodology for developing each element. Using mathematical
analysis and heuristics as tools, each element was further developed to show approaches
of describing them. The challenges of prescribing a security architecture for net-centric
systems were enumerated and discussed at length. The relevance of developing a security
methodology for large scale net-centric operations, despite the obstacles, can be deduced
since society has come to rely on such networks for daily activities and more.
An overview of system architecture was presented to show conceptually where a
security architecture resides in relation to systems architecting and architecture in
general. Also security architecture requirements for net-centric system were offered. The
methodology began by carefully performing critical success factors analysis bearing in
mind the goals of the proposed security architecture methodology.
Furthermore, the five elements of security architectures, namely Security Policy
& Standards, Security Risk Management, Security Auditing, Security Federation and
Security Management of services and process, were individually elaborated and
developed by presenting mathematical analysis where applicable and methodologies were
in turn prescribed. An overarching methodology was aggregated and put forward.
The methodology can be scaled to size for smaller net-centric operations such as
UMR, by focusing on the important elements. Because of the open nature of an
educational institution’s networks, focus can be shifted to the elements of most
importance or where a security breach is most likely to occur.
Following the methodology developed, the current security architecture at UMR
was presented and recommendations given for the future.
Future work in this area would be to implement this security architecture by
following the procedures demonstrated in this thesis, as well as upgrading this
methodology since it has already been established that security is dynamic entity.
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APPENDIX
DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY (DISA), MARCH 1, 2004. A
SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR NET-CENTRIC ENTERPRISE SERVICES
VERSION 0.3.
For the reference document please visit:
http://horizontalfusion.dtic.mil/docs/specs/20040310_NCES_Security_Arc.pdf
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